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Abstract
The Monty Hall Problem (MHP) has a counterintuitive solution, and people have the 
propensity to stay with their initial selection even though switching has a higher 
probability o f success. Surface and structural similarity in analogical reasoning was used 
to investigate transfer from a card game to the MHP. Congruency between the number of 
cards and doors produced greater transfer to the MHP when the probabilities were salient. 
Transfer from the card game to the MHP is based on surface similarity and a complete 
transfer based on structural similarity is rare because of the difficulty in understanding 
the conditional probabilities in both domains.
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Introduction
Analogies can be used as a means of understanding new concepts or deriving 
solutions to a novel problem. A person can learn about a new concept by conceptually 
noting its relationship to existing knowledge. For instance, in teaching a new concept 
such as the underlying mechanisms of the hydrogen atom, a person can draw an analogy 
between molecular and solar systems in order to understand the processes involved in the 
hydrogen atom (c.f. Gentner & Toupin, 1986). Applying an already learned concept to 
understand a new one can facilitate a greater understanding of a complex problem. 
Analogies can be a useful tool in solving problems, interpreting information or situations.
The plan o f this paper is as follows. Firstly, there is a brief introduction to the 
concept of analogical reasoning, especially pertaining to the surface and deep structural 
components. Secondly, a counterintuitive problem, the Monty Hall Problem (MHP) is 
described and how analogical reasoning can be applied to the MHP. Thirdly, three 
experiments were conducted to investigate the role of analogical reasoning from one 
domain (a card game) to the target problem (the MHP).
Theoretical Background of Analogical Reasoning
The use o f analogies involves the transfer o f knowledge from one context or 
domain to another by generating knowledge from a source domain that can be applied to 
a target domain (Chen, 1995; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & 
Thagard, 1986; Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Sternberg, 1977). The novel domain is the target 
whereas the knowledge from an already learned domain is considered the source. For 
instance in the solar and hydrogen atom example, in order to understand the underlying 
mechanisms involved, a person maps the elementary causal structures of the solar system
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(the sun is more massive than a planet and the planet revolves around the sun) to the 
underlying causal structures in the hydrogen atom (the nucleus is more massive than an 
electron and the electron revolves around the nucleus). There are four basic steps to 
analogical problem solving: These processes are encoding, inference, mapping, and 
application. Encoding requires identifying the attributes and values of the source and the 
target problem. Inference involves the selection of the source as a potential analog to the 
target problem. Mapping requires the recognition between similar and different elements 
of the source and the target. The application entails an extension of the mapping to create 
rules that can be applied to the target in order to achieve a solution (Chen, 1995; Holland 
et al., 1986; Sternberg, 1977). These processes are essential in order for an analogy 
between two domains to be drawn, although they need not follow a strict consecutive 
order for transfer to occur (Holyoak & Koh, 1987). The foundation of analogical 
reasoning is based on the use of existing knowledge to understand another domain. A 
source analog that is stored in memory must be retrieved in order to apply it to the target. 
Which source analog will be retrieved, depends on many factors such as its accessibility, 
surface features, and structure.
Three processes guide analogies: These processes are similarity, structure, and 
purpose. Similarity can be based on surface features or structural components. Surface 
similarity refers to identifying two domains that have no causal role in determining 
possible solution of an analog, and structural similarity identifies the elements that 
influence the attainment of the solution (Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Holyoak & Thagard, 
1989). Holyoak and Koh (1987) stated “in practice, however, the problem solver’s 
ability to distinguish surface from structural features will almost inevitably be imperfect,
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since initial understanding of the unfamiliar target problem will be impoverished”
(p.334). Surface features may be used initially to draw the analogy, but the deep 
structural components are necessary for successful transfer of the correct solution. Thus,
i
a novel problem that shares both surface and structural similarity with a source problem 
may be retrieved and applied more often than a novel problem that shares dissimilar 
surface, but similar deep structural elements. It is necessary that the problem solver 
constructs a mapping between the source and target problem for transfer to occur. 
However, mapping is not sufficient for transfer since a person can successfully map 
between two domains, but may not be to adapt the solution from the source to the target 
(Novick & Holyoak, 1991). The last process is the person’s goal or purpose for 
considering the analogy (Holyoak &Thagard, 1995). That is, a person must apply the 
appropriate solution to solve the novel problem.
The “General” and “Radiation” problems are commonly used to provide examples 
of analogical transfer using a source analog to derive the correct solution to a target 
problem. The “General” problem involves an army general who must decide on the best 
strategy to attack a fortress given that he cannot attack the fortress via the main road. The 
correct solution is for the general to send his troops from different roads to converge 
simultaneously on the fortress. In the “Radiation” problem, a patient has a stomach 
tumor and requires a strong ray to destroy the tumor, but the intensity of the dosage will 
destroy the healthy surrounding tissue. The solution is analogous to the solution required 
to solve the “General” problem: Use lower intensity doses simultaneously converging on 
the tumor. The analog solution is derived less often spontaneously (20 percent) than 
when people are provided with a hint to consider one of the problems that have read (92
6
percent) to derive the solution to the Radiation problem (Gick & Holyoak, 1980). Thus, 
the use of a hint helps the person to search for a mapping to initiate immediately and 
without the hint the person may search different domains that have fewer common 
elements to link the source to the target analog (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989). Similarly, a 
hint aided in the analogical transfer between previously exposed schematic pictures that 
provide a solution to a specific problem (Chen, 1995). In analogical problem reasoning, 
a hint increased transfer more than the non-hint situation. People do not always 
spontaneously see the analogy, and may require explicit suggestion in order to retrieve 
source information to generate the correct solution.
People rely on similarities and differences in the associated content both when 
they retrieve potential analogies from memory and when mapping the retrieved solution 
to the target problem (Bassok, 1996). The more dissimilar or incongruent the source and 
target problem, the less transfer should occur. Another indication of a “successful 
transfer of learning generally involves overcoming contextual barriers”(Gick & Holyoak, 
1980, p. 349). Hence, people must be able to see past the surface similarities and 
dissimilarities to the structural similarities of the two domains in order to achieve the goal 
of successful transfer of the deep structure from one domain to another.
For instance, the General and Radiation problem have similar structural 
similarities, but very little surface similarity. The structural process focuses on the 
consistent conceptual parallels between the roles of the source and target domains. The 
conceptual similarity for the above problems consist of an attacking strategy that must be 
employed through the simultaneously converging of the rays/troops on the target. Thus,
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the “General” solution is used a mechanism to elicit the correct solution to the 
“Radiation” problem.
The Monty Hall Problem
The MHP is a hypothetical reasoning task that is especially difficult since the 
mathematically correct solution is counterintuitive. The MHP is a game show scenario 
with an honest host and a contestant. In the game, there are three doors. Behind one of 
the doors is a valuable prize (a new car) and behind each of the other doors is an 
undesirable prize (a goat). First, the game show contestant selects one of three doors (e.g. 
contestant selects door 1). Then the host opens one of the unselected doors to reveal that 
the car is not behind that door (e.g. host opens door 2). After revealing the contents of a 
door, the host asks the contestant whether she would like to stay with the initial selection 
(doorl) or switch to the other unopened door (door 3). The answer seems simply obvious 
that the probabilities of the prize are equal, but this is mathematically incorrect. The 
probability that the prize is behind the initial selected door is still 1/3, and that the car is 
behind the unopened door is now 2/3 (Bar-Hillel, 1989; Gillman, 1992).
The corrept response to the MHP is based on conditional probability, but there is a 
tendency to believe that the door that has been opened is now eliminated so the 
probabilities should be equal since there are two doors remaining. In 1990, Marilyn vos 
Savant was asked to solve the MHP by one of her readers. She responded with the 
correct solution that contestant should switch because after opening the door the 
probabilities favor the unopened and unselected door. As a result of her response, she 
received many letters from both readers and mathematicians informing her that she was 
incorrect (vos Savant, 1996). Not only do people judge the probabilities as equal, but also
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they are highly confident of their response (c.f. Falk, 1992). People rely to various 
degrees on their intuitions when making decisions. A characteristic of intuition is the 
perseverance in being resistant to alternative arguments (Falk, 1992). In the MHP, the 
correct solution is counter to a person’s intuition.
An interesting aspect of the MHP is that although people judge the probabilities 
as equal, they have the overwhelming propensity to stay with the initial selection. Given 
that people believe that there is an equal chance of winning and losing, there should be an 
equal distribution of people who select to stay or switch doors in the MHP. Yet, this does 
not occur. It seems that once a person has committed to a certain door, it is more 
compelling to stay with the first choice rather than switch.
Although switching is the mathematically correct solution in the MHP, it is rarely 
selected. When the MHP was presented as a word problem, most participants (84-87 
percent) overwhelmingly stayed with their initial selection (Granberg & Brown, 1995, 
Platt & Watkins, 1997). Furthermore, when asked to determine the probability of 
winning the prize after the host reveals a door, over 93 percent of respondents select the 
equal probability (50-50 conclusion) although they had correctly estimated that the initial 
probability is 1/3 for the selected door (Platt & Watkins, 1997). Varying the number of 
doors in the MHP to three, five or seven did not significantly impact the percentage of 
switching responses (Granberg & Brown, 1995). Over 90 percent o f people remained 
with their initial door selection. These findings indicate the remarkable propensity to stay 
with the initial selected door.
In computer trials that simulated the MHP, success of utilizing the switching 
strategy varied as a function of the amounts of points awarded for staying or switching
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and winning. Switching percentages across the last block of ten trials differed between 
those who received one point (55percent), 2 points (73 percent), and 4 points (88 percent) 
indicating a linear relationship between switching performance and point incentive 
(Granberg & Brown, 1995). The researchers did not investigate whether learning to 
switch in the computer simulations transferred to switching in the MHP word version. It 
is a leap to assume that participants understood the switching strategy and would adopt it 
in the MHP without testing to ensure that this would actually occur.
A Game Used as a Source for Analogical Reasoning to Solve MHP 
A card game was created to simulate the probabilities in the MHP. The purpose 
of the game was to provide participants with a method to learn that switching is the best 
strategy and about the probabilities associated with winning as a function of staying or 
losing in the game. There were two versions of the card game: a 3-card and 10-card 
game. The rules are similar for both games. The 3-card game consisted of three cards (an 
ace and two non-ace cards). The participant selected a card, then one non-ace card was 
revealed, and then the participant decided to stay with the initial selected card or switch 
to the other card (that had not been selected nor revealed). A similar design was 
employed for the ten-card situation, except eight cards were revealed before the 
participant indicated the preference to stay or switch. The goal of the game was for 
participants to learn the switching strategy and probabilities of the card game, so that they 
were provided with a better opportunity for the transfer of this knowledge to the MHP.
The 3-card game is an analogous simulation of the actual MHP problem, and the 
10-card game is slightly less analogous since it does not contain the same number f  doors 
nor does it simulate the exact actual MHP probabilities. Specifically, the 3-card game
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simulated the 33:66 (stay: switch) probabilities of the MHP and the 10-card game 
simulates 10:90 (stay: switch) probabilities. The 10-card probabilities were easier to 
discern because of the salience of the number of cards being revealed. The concrete goal 
of each card game is to learn to switch and to attain a greater winning percentage across 
trials. Schemas about existing learned knowledge can serve as identifying retrieval cues 
to access relevant source analogs (Holland et al., 1986). It is unlikely that most people 
have a problem-solving schema for the correct solution in memory for the MHP because 
most people respond with the incorrect equal probability solution. Consequently, learning 
about the probabilities involved and the switching strategy in a card game may help 
develop a retrieval analog to solve the MHP.
Experiment 1
An experiment was conducted to investigate whether surface and deep structural 
similarity and between the number of cards and number of doors facilitated greater 
transference to the MHP. The experimental design consisted of number of cards in the 
game (3 or 10), decision making choice constraint on card trials (free choice = a choice 
for each trial or constrained choice = choice effective for 5 trials), and number of doors in 
the MHP word problem (3 or 10-door version). The design was a 2x2x2 between- 
participants design. A within-participants examination of the learning across card trials 
was also examined.
HI: Switching learning curve performance would be different fo r 3-card and 10-card 
players. Specifically, 10-card game players would begin switching more often 
from the onset o f  the game and maintained higher switching percentages across 
all trials than the 3-card game players.
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The probabilities associated with switching in the 10-card game are more salient than for 
the 3-card game. That is, once a player begins the 10-card game, it is much clearer that 
staying is not the winning strategy since there is a 10 percent chance that the person will 
select the ace initially: This does not assume that the player will understand why 
switching is better.
Participants who selected to switch in the MHP are hereafter known as switchers 
and those who selected to stay in the MHP are hereafter known as stickers.
H2: MHP stickers would have different strategies in the card game and would have 
less positive reinforcement associated with switching than MHP switchers would 
in the card game.
If the player in the card game selects to switch and is positively reinforced for switching 
by winning more frequently, then the player would be more likely to transfer the 
switching strategy to the MHP because of prior success in the card game. Card game 
players, who are not positively reinforced for switching as often, may not view switching 
as advantageous and therefore would not select to switch in the MHP.
H3: Mapping between the card game and the MHP would be greatest when the cards 
and doors are congruent (surface similarity), especially when the probabilities 
are more salient.
Objects that are similar create better mapping, which results in mapped differences 
becoming more explicit, so that mapping differences are more similar than unmapped 
(Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). Thus, transfer of the switching strategy from the card game 
to the MHP would occur at a greater percentage when the number of cards and doors 
were similar than the dissimilar. Particularly, the congruent surface similarity between
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the card game and MHP should increase switching for the 10-card (10-door) condition 
more often than the 3-card (3-door) condition. Again, this is a function of the 
probabilities being more salient in the 10-card version than the 3-card version. Also, it 
was expected that the congruent number o f cards and doors would enhance the 
percentage of participants who correctly identified the probabilities of switching and 
winning in the MHP. The latter prediction entails the deep structural similarities between 
the card game the MHP versions. In the card game, the surface features of the cards are 
more salient than most problems that involve analogical reasoning where the surface 
features are less salient (c.f. Holyoak & Koh, 1987). Thus, the surface features will have 
a stronger impact on retrieving the correct solution to the MHP.
H4: In incongruent number o f  cards and doors conditions, 10-card (3-door)
participants would transfer the switching strategy more often than by 3-card (10- 
door) participants.
The prediction was based on the fact that the probabilities in the 10-card situation favor 
switching and that 10-cards players were expected to experience positive reinforcement 
(winning) for switching more often than the 3-card players would. These two conditions 
were expected to generate less correct estimations of the probability of switching and 
winning. Hence, people who are able to overcome the different context of the cards and 
doors should be able to transfer the information to a greater degree than those who pay 
more attention to differences of contexts. Transfer fails because superficial aspects of 
content remain associated with the solution and it outweighs the relevant aspects of the 
structure of the solution. (Bassok, 1996). Consequently, participants who attribute
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winning and losing to superficial reasons (i.e. positioning of the cards) rather than the 
probabilities would not transfer the switching strategy to the MHP.
H5: The choice constraint conditions in the card trials (free choice vs. constrained 
choice) would encourage participants to think about the consequences o f  staying 
or switching in the game. Specifically, constrained choice participants would 
gain greater insight into the stay or switch outcomes than those who have a 
choice fo r each card trial would.
Constrained choice participants had the opportunity to view staying or switching 
decisions for five trials and the outcome associated with the decision. By noting card 
trial outcomes in blocks rather than separate trials, they would have an opportunity to 
think about the consequences of the stay or switch decision as well as use this knowledge 
to decide a strategy for wining in future trials. The free choice participants would not 
have the advantage of associating the switch or win strategies in blocks and thus be less 
likely to think of what is the best winning long-term strategy over all trials.
Method
Participants
Undergraduate students (N = 142) at the College of William & Mary participated 
in the experiment for course credit. Each condition had 18 participants except for 2 
conditions that had only 17 participants. In order to have a baseline for switching 
response in the MHP, 32 undergraduates (naive to the MHP) responded to one of two 
versions MHP (3 or 10-door) without exposure to the practice card game.
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Materials
Playing cards were divided into sets containing 3 or 10 cards, and in each set there 
was one ace (the “winning” card). A chart consisting of four-block grids was provided 
for participants to record their wins and losses as a function o f switching and staying for 
all card trials. There were two versions of a MHP word problem: the original 3-door 
version and a 10-door version (see Appendix A for the original version).
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight conditions. Each 
participant played 30 consecutive trials of either a 3-card or 10-card game. The 
participants were instructed that the goal of the game was to select the ace on each trial.
In the 3-card game, the participant selected a card, and then the experimenter always 
revealed a non-ace card. The experimenter offered the participant the opportunity to stay 
with the initial card selection or switch to the other card that was not selected or turned 
over. In addition, half of the participants were allowed to choose to stay or switch on each 
trial and the other half had a constrained choice that was effective for 5 trial blocks. 
Constrained choice was intended to permit the participant to use a long-term strategy and 
to observe outcomes. After indicating the choice, the participant’s card was revealed. 
Participants recorded their wins or losses due to staying or switching for each card trial 
on the chart.
The 10-card game followed the same procedure, except 8 non-ace cards were 
revealed. After completing all trials, participants answered either the 3-door or 10-door 
MHP word problem.
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Results
Switching in the Card Game
The switching learning curve was assessed by analyzing blocks of five trials in 
the card game per participant. An ANOVA revealed a main effect for block trial F (5, 
690) = 17.46, p< .05. There was also a main effect for number of cards F (1, 138) = 
68.51, p< .05. The main effects for choice constraint was not significant, F (1, 138) = 
0.48, p > .05. Additionally, there were no significant interactions, except for cards by 
choice, F (1, 138) = 5.59, p< .05. Figure 1 denotes the interaction and switching curve for 
all card game conditions. Participants in the 10-card game were switching more than 3- 
card participants, but the switching strategies were not consistent within the card groups 
for the free and constrained choices.
An independent t-test was conducted on how often participants selected to switch 
across the 30 trials in the card game. The analysis revealed a significant difference 
between 3-card players (M = 12.94, SD = 6.27) and 10-card players (M = 21.61, SD = 
6.41), t (140) = 8.15, p < .05. This significance is expected since the 10-card game favors 
switching more than the 3-card game does. Furthermore, on average 3-card players won 
8.76 times and 10-card players won 19.92 times when they selected to switch in the card 
game whereas 3-card players won 6.21 times and 10-card players won 0.93 times when 
they selected to stay in the card game. Thus, overall in the card game, switching was 
reinforced with a greater likelihood of winning than staying: This is consistent with the 
MHP expected outcome.
In addition, a t-test was conducted on switching and winning reinforcement in the 
card game between MHP stickers (M = 10.81, SD = 7.40) and MHP switchers (M =
16
17.37, SD 6.30) revealed a significant difference, t_(140) = 5.68, p < .05. The MHP 
switchers were being reinforced slightly more often for switching in the game than MHP 
stickers were. Switching learning curves for switchers and stickers are depicted in Figure
2. MHP switchers adopted more switching from the first trial block and across trial 
blocks.
MHP Response
Slightly more participants selected to stay (n =72) than switch (n =70) in the 
MHP. An ANOVA conducted on switching responses in the MHP revealed significant 
main effects for cards and doors, Fs (1, 134) = 25.48 and 5.10, p< .05, respectively. 
Overall, participants in the 3-card game switched 31% whereas 10-card game players 
switched 69% of the time. On average, those who answered the 3-door MHP switched 
41% compared to 58% for 10-door participants. There was not a significant main effect 
for choice constraint, F (1, 134) = 3.81, g = .08. The interactions were not significant, 
except for cards by doors, F_(l, 134) = 5.10, g_< .05. See Table 1 for switching responses 
in the MHP as a function of number of cards and doors. As expected, the 10-card (10- 
door) participants were switching more often.
Probability Estimation
An ANOVA conducted on the participants’ mean estimation of the probability of 
staying and winning in the MHP revealed a significant main effect for cards and doors, Fs 
(1, 133) = 5.77 and 12.41, g< .05, respectively. In the cards main effect, 3-card 
participants responded with a 50% probability compared to 43% for 10-card respondents 
(see Table 2 for mean estimations across all experiments). For the doors main effect, 
participants in the 3-door condition estimated the probability as 49% compared to 42% in
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the 10-door condition. There were no significant interactions or main effect of choice. 
One participant was excluded from the analysis because he did not respond with a
numerical value to the question. ,
i
Overall, three people generated the correct probability (66%) of switching and 
winning in the 3-door MHP. Eleven people generated the correct probability (90%) for 
the 10-dooor MHP (seven were in the constrained 10-card (10-door) and three in the free 
10-card (10-door) conditions). Thus, participants are learning to switch without the full 
understanding of the probabilities involved in the MHP. Table 3 represents the number 
of people who correctly estimated the switching and winning probability in the 3-door 
and 10-door MHP for all experiments.
Discussion
Overall, participants were able to increasingly learn to switch across card trials. 
The switching learning curve was as predicted with the 10-card players switching more 
often than 3-card players. Additionally, more 10-card players began switching at a higher 
level and continued to switch across trial blocks than did the 3-card players. The 
interaction of cards by choice may be partially due to constrained 10-card participants 
electing to stay rather than switch. For instance, in the constrained 10-card condition, six 
people had achieved insight into the probabilities but decided to stay for two or more 
blocks because it was more challenging and fun to try to get the ace on first selection. As 
can be seen in Figure 2, switching strategies are different amongst MHP switchers and 
stickers. Switchers are more likely to switch from the onset and continue to do so at a 
higher rate than stickers. In addition, MHP stickers were positively reinforced less often
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than were MHP switchers in the card game. Reinforcement of switching and winning is 
an important component involved in the transfer of the switching strategy to the MHP.
Surface similarity played an important role in transfer from the card game to the 
MHP. Participants switched more often in the 10-door MHP than the 3-door MHP. 
Additionally, switching in the MHP was greater for the 10-card game players than the 3- 
card game players. These results were consistent with the hypothesis that the salient 
probabilities of the 10-card game should increase the switching response in the MHP and 
provides support for the concept that the probabilities are more salient as the number of 
cards or doors increases. The interaction of the cards by doors reflects the fact that the 
10-card (10-door) condition had greater switching responses than the 3-card (3-door) 
condition, but the 10-card (3-door) condition also produced more switching in the MHP 
than the 3-card (3-door) condition. The percentage of MHP switching was greatest for the 
10-card (10-door) situation that contains both surface and structural similarities. The 10- 
card (3-door) situation contains less surface similarity because of the incongruity between 
the number of cards and doors; however, the structural similarity of switching in the 
game was transferred to some degree to the MHP. The surface and structural similarity 
between the number o f cards and doors are more easily transferred when the probabilities 
are more salient.
Deep structural similarity between the card game and the MHP did not facilitate 
the generation of the correct response to the MHP switching and winning probability. 
Very few participants generated the correct response to either the 3-door or 10-door 
MHP. Interestingly, people are not achieving insight into the actual probabilities of the
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MHP: This suggests that part o f the reason that the MHP is particularly difficult is that 
the conditional probabilities are not easily understood.
The choice constraint manipulation was not significantly effective in producing 
greater transfer from the card game to the MHP. As can be seen in Figure 3, constrained 
choice may have influenced switching from the 3-card game situations to the MHP, but 
constrained choice was not as much of a factor for switching in the 10-card game 
situations. Perhaps, constrained choice is somewhat helpful when the probabilities are 
not very salient, but in salient probability situations there may be a greater likelihood of 
noting the switching strategy across card trials regardless of choice.
Although, participants overwhelmingly selected the probabilities as being equal 
in the MHP, they were switching more often if they have had success with switching and 
winning in the card game. Thus, switching in the MHP is not contingent upon insight into 
the probabilities of the game and/or the MHP. People were learning to switch in the MHP 
regardless^if they understood the probabilities involved. The switching response in the 
MHP by participants reflected partial transfer from the card game to the MHP that is 
based on surface similarities, but not deep structural similarities.
Since participants were not fully comprehending the reason for switching in the 
MHP, Experiment 2 was designed as a replication of Experiment 1 using computer trials 
to simulate the card game as well as the incorporation of the manipulation of a hint. 
Previous research has demonstrated that the use of a hint is effective in the analogical 
transfer o f the correct solution from the source to the target problem (Gick & Holyoak, 
1983; Holyoak & Koh,1987; Novick & Holyoak, 1991). The explicit use of a hint aided 
participants to actively use the deep structural similarities as an analog between the
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source and target problem. A hint was incorporated in the next experiment to see if this 
would allow participants to note the deep structural similarities between the card game 
and the MHP. The hint was simply a reminder for participants to use the information that 
they had learned in the computer card game trials to solve the MHP. Furthermore, the 
hint was used to help facilitate explicit mapping of the card game to the problem that may 
not have spontaneously occurred without the hint.
Experiment 2
The manipulation of a hint was investigated through a replication of Experiment 1 
using computer card trials. The use of computer trials ensures that experimenter error is 
not a factor, such as the player attributing the outcome of the game to the experimenter. 
The aim of this experiment was to replicate the previous findings that similarity and 
congruity between the number of cards and doors played an important role in the 
switching responses to the MHP. In addition, providing a hint condition increases the 
likelihood of switching in the MHP since the analogy of the card game and the MHP was 
made explicit. The experiment consisted of number of cards in computer card game (3 or 
10), the use of a hint (hint or no hint), and the MHP versions (3 or 10-door). The 
experiment was a between-participants design.
HI: Switching would occur more often in the 10-card game than the 3-card game 
since the probabilities associated with switching in the 10-card game favor 
switching more than fo r the 3-card game. Also, MHP stickers would have 
different strategies in the card game and would have less positive reinforcement 
associated with switching than switchers would in the card game
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This prediction was consistent with the first two hypotheses in Experiment 1. In addition, 
these hypotheses were supported in the previous experiment.
H2: Mapping between the card game and the MHP should be greatest when the cards 
and doors are congruent (surface similarity) and the hint was employed 
especially when the probabilities are more salient.
Particularly, the congruent surface similarity between the card game and MHP should 
increase switching for the 10-card (10-door) condition more often than the 3-card (3- 
door) condition. In addition, switching would increase in the 3-card (3-door) condition 
with a hint since it has both surface and structural similarity than the non-hint condition.
H3: Incongruent number o f  cards and doors conditions, the switching strategy would 
be transferred more often in the 10-card (3-door) hint condition than the 3-card 
(10-door) hint condition. Overall, the hint condition would increase switching 
across all conditions.
The use of the hint would allow participants to pay attention to features of the card game 
that go beyond surface similarity. Noting features other than surface similarity is 
especially important when the surface features are dissimilar. The prediction regarding 
the 10-card (3-door) condition is consist with the fourth hypothesis in Experiment land 
the results of the study supported the prediction.
A post-game questionnaire was created to assess the degree to which participants felt 
that the computer game was fair, if strategies were used, and to what degree the 
participant attributed his performance in the card game to be within his control versus 
based on luck.
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H4: 3-card players wouldfind the game more fa ir than 10-card players, but 10-card 
players would use strategies more often in the game and would feel that they had 
more control in the game than 3-cardplayers.
The reason for this prediction is that 10-card players may attribute the game as being 
rigged because of the greater switching and winning outcome if they do not understand 
the probabilities involved in the game. Furthermore, 3-card players would not employ 
the use of a strategy consistently across the game and would attribute their performance 
in the game to be based more often on luck than control.
An additional questionnaire was designed to assess decision-making processes in 
order to establish if there was an affective component to staying in the MHP. Of 
particular interest was the statement “I would feel worse if I changed my mind and was 
wrong than if I stayed with my initial choice and was wrong”.
H5: Stickers would agree that they would indeed feel worse i f  the above statement 
was true more often than switchers would.
Perhaps, part of the decision to stay or switch in the MHP is based on the emotions 
involved with losing. Granberg and Brown (1995) suggest that the reason that people 
stay in the MHP involves a mental simulation of how the person would feel if they had 
switched and lost versus stayed and lost.
Method
Participants
Introductory Psychology students (N = 144) at the College of William & Mary 
participated in the experiment. Each condition had 18 participants. All participants
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received credit and fulfilled a partial requirement for their Introduction to Psychology 
class.
Materials ,
i
The card game used in pilot study was programmed onto a computer using 
Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0 programming software. The program was designed to 
simulate the actual probabilities of each game: 33:66 (stay: switch) in the 3-card game 
and 10:90 (stay: switch) in the 10-card game. The program was designed to generate a 
random card position assignment to ensure that there was no superficial effect due to the 
position of the cards in the game. The card game consisted of either 3 or 10 cards. In 
the 3-card game, there are three cards that are presented faced down on the screen. The 
participant selected a card by clicking the box that corresponds to the card. A message 
box appears indicating the card that the participant has selected. The participant’s card 
was not revealed. Instead, another card was revealed to indicate that it is not the ace.
The 10-card game was similar except eight cards were revealed. After revealing the 
card(s), the participant made a decision to stay with the initial selected card or switch to 
the remaining card that was not revealed or selected by the participant. After the 
selection, the participant received feedback as to whether they won or lost depending if 
they stayed or switched. The participant was in control of each trial and only received the 
feedback that was consistent with his card selection and decision to stay or switch. In 
addition, there was a 4-block grid char for each person to record his performance on the 
game across all 30 trials. A 3 or 10-door word version of the MHP followed the card 
game. Two questionnaires were administered after completion of the MHP. One 
questionnaire (see Appendix B) assessed the affective component of switching and
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losing. The statement o f interest was imbedded within the 20 statements. A second 
questionnaire (see Appendix C) was designed to assess how each participant viewed the 
fairness o f the game, any strategies that were employed in the game, and to what degree 
the person thought that his performance in the game was based on luck. All questions in 
both questionnaires were assessed on a 1 to 5 scale.
Procedure
All participants were randomly assigned to one of eight possible conditions. 
Participants were tested in groups of 2 to 4. Four computers were set up with the card 
game. As soon as the participant arrived, they were seated at a computer terminal and 
were given general instructions on how to play the game and how to record their 
performance on a 4-block table. Participants were instructed that the goal of the game is 
to produce a strategy that will result in the greatest number of wins (selecting the ace).
The game consisted of 30 card trials and one practice trial. After the game was 
completed, all participants completed the MHP word problem. They received one of four 
versions of the problem that contained either a hint that they may use the card game in 
deriving their answer to the MHP or no hint, and either 3 or 10-door MHP. Afterwards, 
ail participants received a short questionnaire assessing their views of the game and 
decision making processes.
Results
Switching in Computer Game
A t-test was conducted on how often participants selected to switch across the 30 
trials in the card game. The analysis revealed a significant difference between 3-card 
players (M = 14.97, SD = 5.99) and 10-card players (M = 24.01, SD = 4.09), t (142) =
10.575, p < .05. This significance was expected since the 10-card game favors switching 
more than the 3-card game. Furthermore, on average 3-card players won 9.72 times and 
10-card players won 21.44 times when they selected to switch in the card game whereas 
3-card players won 4.97 times and 10-card players won 0.69 times when they selected to 
stay in the card game. Thus, overall in the card game, switching is reinforced with a 
greater likelihood of winning than staying: This is consistent with the MHP outcomes. In 
addition, a t-test was conducted on switching and winning reinforcement in the computer 
game between MHP stickers (M = 13.18, SD = 8.4) and MHP switchers (M =17.62, SD 
6.37) revealed a significant difference, t_(120) = 3.59, p < .05. (The degrees of freedom 
for the last t-test were adjusted since equal variances were not assumed in the analysis). 
The MHP switchers were being reinforced slightly more often for switching in the game 
than the MHP stickers.
Post- Computer Game Questionnaire
Independent t-tests were conducted on the post-computer game questions. All 
questions were based on a scale ranging from 1 to 5. For the question as to whether the 
participants thought that the computer game was fair, there was no significant difference 
between response for 3-card (M = 3.68, SD =1.11) and 10-card (M = 3.44, SD =1.27) 
players, t_(140) = 1.20, p> .05. Overall, participants thought that the game was quite fair 
but not completely fair. For the question of whether participants followed any strategies 
while playing the game, there was a significant difference between 3-card (M = 2.99, SD 
=1.23) and 10-card (M = 3.89, SD =1.15) players, t (141) = 4.56, p < .05. The 10-card 
participants were following some sort of strategy more often than the 3-card participants 
were. For the question of whether the participants believed that the game was based on
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luck or was within complete control, there was a significant difference between 3-card 
(M = 2.50, SD =1.13) and 10-card (M = 3.38, SD =1.25) players, t (141) = 4.356, p 
< .05. The 10-card players believed that the game was more within their control and was 
less based on luck than the 3-card players.
MHP Response
Slightly more participants selected to switch (n = 78) than stay (n = 66) in the 
MHP. An ANOVA conducted on the switching response of the MHP word problem 
revealed a significant main effect for number of cards in the computer game, F (1, 136) = 
5.83, p < .05. Overall, 3-card game (44%) participants switched less on the MHP word 
problem than the 10-card game (64%). There were no significant main effects for the 
hint condition and MHP word problem, Fs (1, 136) = 1.90, p > .05. Furthermore, the 
only significant interaction was for number of cards in computer game by MHP word 
problem, F (1, 136) = 4.20, p < .05. See Table 1 for mean switching responses for MHP 
as a function of number of cards by number of doors. Again, the most switching 
occurred in the 10-card (10-door) condition. Figure 4 depicts the mean switching 
responses across for all conditions.
Probability Estimation
An ANOVA conducted on the participants’ mean estimation of the probability of 
staying and winning in the MHP revealed a significant main effect that was approaching 
significance for MHP word problem, F (1, 134) = 3.91, p = .05. Overall, 3-door 
participants indicated that the probability of winning the car as 50% whereas the 10-door 
participants estimated the probability of winning as 46%. See Table 2 for comparison of 
estimations across all experiments. The main effects for hint condition and computer
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game number of cards were not significant, Fs (1, 134) < 1.0, p > .05. No interactions 
were significant.
Only nine participants estimated the correct response for switching and winning 
in the MHP. In the 3-door MHP, 1/72 (1-%) people correctly generated the 2/3 
conclusion and 8/70 (11%) in the 10-door correctly generated the 9/10 conclusion. The 
3-door person was in the 3-card hint condition. Of the 10-door people, four were in the 
10-card no hint condition, three were in the 10-card hint condition, and one in the 3-card 
no hint condition. Again, transfer is greater for congruent than incongruent cards and 
doors. Table 3 depicts the number of people who generated the correct probability 
responses for the 3-door and 10-door MHP for all experiments.
Affect Associated with Switching
Finally, a t-test was conducted on the statement “I would feel worse if I changed 
my mind and was wrong than if I stayed with my initial choice and was wrong”. A score 
of 1 on the above statement corresponds to the response “exactly like me” and a score of 
5 corresponds to the response “not at all like me”. There was no significant difference 
between MHP stickers (M = 1.85, SD = 1.03) and MHP switchers (M = 1.66, SD = 0.95), 
t (140) = 0.66, e> .05.
Discussion
The card game manipulation check worked since players were reinforced for 
switching in the 10-card game more often than in the 3-card game and this outcome was 
expected. Although, there was a difference in the positive reinforcement attributed to 
switching in the card game for switchers and stickers. MHP switchers received slightly 
more instances of positive reinforcement for switching than MHP stickers. Again, this
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result is consistent with the pilot study. On average, MHP stickers and switchers adopted 
different learning patterns for the card game and this may have further influenced their 
decision to stay or switch in the game. Although, this is not the only factor, for there 
were clear instances in which players adopted a switch and win strategy in the game, but 
selected to stay in the MHP.
Slightly more participants switched in the computer card game than in the pilot 
study. Surface similarity in the 3-card game had a more pronounced effect in transfer 
from the card game to the MHP. More participants were switching in the 3-card (3- 
door) and 3-card (10-door) conditions than they had in the pilot study (see Table 1). The 
improved performance may be attributed to participants feeling more in control of the 
game than in the situation where an experimenter was shuffling and revealing the cards. 
However, 10-card (3-door) participants in the computer game were similar to the same 
condition in the pilot study. There was a slight decrease in 10-card (10-door) switching 
responses in the computer card game from the pilot study. This may be the result of the 
constrained choice manipulation. Although, the choice manipulation was not significant 
in the previous study, it did seem to affect 10-card participants more in terms of 
understanding the probabilities involved in the card game.
For the mean estimation of the probability to stay and win, almost all MHP 
respondents were estimating the probability as being equal (although 10-door respondents 
were selecting a slightly lower probability). Nonetheless, these estimations do not come 
near the correct estimation. These results support the notion that surface features are 
influencing the participants’ decision to stay or switch in the MHP, but they do not truly 
understand the causal relationship (the probabilities) associated with switching. The deep
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structure characteristics were not fully transferred to the MHP for most participants.
Once again, very few people estimated the correct probability for switching and winning
in the MHP (see Table 2 for comparison between pilot study and experiment 1).
!
In addition, MHP stickers did not differ from MHP switchers on the statement 
that they would feel worse if they had switched and lost than stayed with an initial 
decision and lost. Both agreed that this statement did reflect their beliefs, but it is 
surprising that the MHP switchers agreed slightly more with the statement. Perhaps, the 
reinforcement on the card game was interacting with the response to the statement.
The failure of hint across conditions was most likely due to the inability to 
understand the probabilities associated with the MHP. However, it should be noted that 
the hint seemed to be most effective in the 10-card (3-door) conditions. This situation 
was consistent with the concept of a hint providing the necessary link for mapping when 
there is surface incongruity. Previous studies (e.g. Gick & Holyoak, 1980) that had 
employed the use of a hint, also had the correct solution explicitly stated in the source 
problem. In the card game, the correct solution was never explicitly stated to the 
participants. Each participant experienced different outcomes in the card game that were 
based on card selections and decisions to stay or switch. Participants were reinforced at 
different rates in their card game experience. Consequently, providing a fixed outcome 
to the card game may possibly influence people’s propensity to stay in the MHP.
Experiment 3 involved manipulating the feedback in the card game to ascertain 
how participants interpret the strategies or plans within the game and how positive and 
negative feedback influences switching responses to the MHP. Since surface more than 
deep features are being transferred in the previous investigations, then manipulating the
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outcome of the card game would influence decisions to stay or switch in the MHP, 
especially in the conditions where surface similarity between the number of cards and 
number of doors are congruent.
Experiment 3
Manipulating the outcome feedback for the card game should impact decision 
making and responses derived to the MHP. For instance, always switching or staying in 
the card game and noting the win/loss outcomes should eventually affect the decision 
processes of the person. The person at some point in time may be convinced that the 
game is biased (Rachlin, 1989). Even if a person believes the probabilities to be equal, 
he should eventually suspect that the game is biased when one outcome consistently 
occurs. If the outcome of the game is consistent with a person’s expectations, then the 
person may be less likely to notice the bias. Also, if the person is mapping surface 
features and not the deep structural features between the card game and the MHP, then 
the person would not necessarily perceive the card game as biased. How does exposure 
to the false outcome feedback influence the decision in the MHP? Does switching and 
winning facilitate a greater switching response in the MHP or will people select to stay
i
with the initial selection? That is, providing participants with a fixed game outcome 
situation should enhance surface similarity between the card game and the MHP. 
Experiment 3 explored how manipulating card trial outcome in the scenario design 
influenced the decision to stay or win the MHP. The experimental design consisted 
number of cards in the game (3 or 10), hypothetical player decision in the game (stay or 
switch cards), win/loss outcome of the game (win or lose 90% of the time), and the 
version of the MHP (a 3 or 10-door version).
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The following predictions were based on participants’ actions in the previous 
studies described above where there was the tendency to rely on surface features when 
deciding to stay or switch in the MHP. Note that there were only 2 conditions in which 
the outcome feedback was not false: 10-card switch and win and 10-card stay and lose.
HI: Switching in the MHP would occur most often in the switch and win and stay and 
lose conditions.
These conditions reinforced and primed participants that switching would lead to 
a better success ratio in the card game. Within these conditions, switching would be the 
greatest for the 10-card (10-door) situation since surface similarity would be congruent. 
Because the outcome feedback positively reinforced switching, the expected MHP 
response was for switching to occur at higher rates in the 3-card (3-door) situation, but 
less often than the 10-card (10-door) situation.
H2: The switch and lose and stay and win conditions would generate the lowest 
amount o f  switching in the MHP.
Since participants did not view a switching reinforcement in the game, the surface 
similarities between the game and the MHP would promote staying in the MHP.
H3: Participants in the incongruent surface similarity conditions would be less 
influenced by the outcome feedback o f  the card game.
That is, in the conditions that reinforced switching, there would be more switching in the 
10-card (3-dooor) situation than the 3-card (10-door) situation, but switching would be 
less than the congruent surface similarity situations between the card game and the MHP. 
A reverse pattern would occur in the conditions in which switching was not reinforced in 
the card game.
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H4: MHP estimations would not differ across conditions since the deep structural 
features o f  the card game would not be transferred to the MHP when the 
participant was not in control o f  the game.
If participants do not have the opportunity to learn about the structural similarity between 
the card game and the MHP from their own experience and performance, then they will 
not achieve the correct estimation, and they will rely on the equal probability solution.
H5: Stickers would agree more with the statement offeeling worse i f  they had 
switched and lost than stayed and lost than switchers would.
Although, the above statement was not significantly different in Experiment 2, it was 
predicted that the lack of control over the card game would not influence responding to 
the statement.
Method
Participants
Introductory Psychology students (N = 259) at the College of William & Mary 
participated in the experiment for credit towards partial fulfillment for course 
requirements. There were 15-18 participants in each condition with 11 conditions 
consisting of 16 people.
Materials
Participants viewed a card game scenario that was placed on 3x5 index cards.
Each index card contained a game that already occurred between a dealer and a player 
with the information about the player’s decision and outcome. The index cards had either 
a 3 or 10-card game scenario. The participants viewed 30 index cards. In the game, the 
player always made one of two decisions: to switch to the other card for all 30 trials or to
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stay with the initial card for all 10 trials. The outcome of the game was manipulated so 
that the player either won or lost 90% of the time. In addition, participants completed 
either a 3 or 10-door MHP word problem.
Procedure
Participants were randomly selected to complete one of sixteen conditions. All 
participants viewed a 3 or 10-card version of one of four index card scenarios (switch and 
win, switch and lose, stay and win or stay and lose). After viewing the 30 index cards, 
participants completed a 3 or 10-door version of the MHP.
Results
MHP Response
A greater number of participants selected to stay (n = 176) than switch (n = 83) in 
the MHP. An ANOVA on the MHP switching response revealed a significant interaction 
for player decision by win/lose outcome, F (I, 243) = 49.09, p< .05. Overall, those 
exposed to the switch and win situation switched 51% in the MHP word problems 
compared to 50% in the stay and lose situation, 18% in the switch and lose, and 9% in the 
stay and win situation. Thus, the surface manipulation worked in which people learned to 
switch more often for conditions that reinforced switching (switch and win, stay and 
lose).
A significant interaction occurred between player stay/switch decision by number 
of cards in game, F (1, 243) = 5.81, p < .05. Overall, those exposed to the switch 10-card 
situation switched 32% of the time in the MHP compared to 37% in the switch 3 card 
situation, 40% in the stay 10-card situation, and 19% in the stay 3-card situation.
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There was a significant interaction for index card number by MHP word problem, 
F (1, 243) = 4.78, p < .05. Overall, the 10-card (10-door) condition switched more often 
than the other conditions, although this was less than previous studies (see Table 1). 
Again, this supports the hypothesis that the switching outcome for the 10-card and 10- 
door problem is more salient and increases transfer. Also, it is interesting that the 
congruent 3-card (3-door) situation produces slightly more switching than the 
incongruent conditions in this experiment.
Finally, the last significant interaction was a four-way interaction for player 
decision by card number by outcome by MHP, F (1, 243) = 5.22, p < .05. Figure 5 
depicts the mean switching responses for all conditions. Several situations were 
influencing the four-way interaction. The 10-card (3-door) were not consistent with the 
hypothesized predictions. In the switch and win condition, switching in the MHP was the 
lower whereas in the switch and lose condition switching was the higher than anticipated. 
Furthermore, the 3-card (3-door) situation in the switch and win condition was slightly 
higher than the 10-card (10-door) situation in the same condition. There was not a 
consistent pattern of switching or staying in the MHP across card and door conditions.
There were no significant main effects for player decision, cards, outcome, and 
MHP, Fs (1, 243) = 0.91, 2.39, 0.56, and 1.33, p> .05, respectively.
Probability Estimation
An ANOVA on the participants’ mean estimation of the probability of staying and 
winning in the MHP word problems revealed a significant main effect for number of 
cards, F (1, 239) = 6.20, p < .05. Overall, those exposed to the 10-card game estimated 
the probability of staying and winning as 46% and those in the 3-card game estimated a
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49% chance of winning. Neither is close to the correct response that is 10% for the 10- 
card game and 33% for the 3-card game. Four participants (2 in 3-door and 2 in 10-door 
MHP) were excluded from the probability estimation analysis because they did not make
i
any numerical estimation. No other main effects or interactions were significant. Again,. 
see Table 2 for mean estimations for all experiments.
Several participants did correctly estimate the switching and winning probabilities 
of the MHP. For those who had the 10-door MHP, 10/126 (8%) correctly generated the 
90 % switch response. Of the ten participants who generated the correct solution to the 
10-door MHP, four were in the 10-card stay and win condition, three in the 10-card stay 
and lose condition, one in the 10-card stay and win, one in the 10-card switch and lose; 
and one in the 3-card switch and win condition. Only 5/129 (4%) correctly generated the 
66% response. Of the five participants who generated the correct response to the 3-door 
MHP, two were in the 3-card switch and win, two were in the 10-card switch and lose, 
and one was in the 3-card stay and lose conditions. See Table 3 for number of 
participants who generated the correct responses in all the experiments. The above 
descriptive statistics support the difficulty of generating the correct solution in the MHP.
It is surprising that there were 3-card people who generated the correct response since the 
false outcome feedback did not generate the 33:66 probabilities. Furthermore, it is 
interesting that there were seven people who were in the conditions in which the feedback 
favored staying (switch and lose and the stay and win) and overcome the false feedback 
and generated the correct response.
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Affect Associated with Switching
Finally, a t-test was conducted on the statement “I would feel worse if I changed 
my mind and was wrong than if I stayed with my initial Choice and was wrong”. The 
analysis revealed a significant difference between MHP stickers (M = 1.67, SD = 0.87) 
and MHP switchers (M = 2.29, SD = 1.22), t (257) = 4.69, p< .05. A score of 1 on the 
above statement corresponds to the response “exactly like me” and a score of 5 
corresponds to the response “not at all like me”. More MHP stickers perceived the 
statement to reflect their beliefs significantly more than the MHP switchers did despite 
the fact that most agree to the above statement.
Discussion
The switch/stay and win/lose outcome feedback manipulation significantly 
affected the MHP responses. Overall, participants switched more often in the MHP after 
being exposed to the index card game with a switch and win or stay and lose condition.
In these conditions, surface similarity played a role in transfer of switching to the MHP. 
People are viewing cards and are primed to switch by the card outcome feedback 
manipulation without regard to the deep structural aspects of actual probabilities involved 
in staying and switching. This reinforces the fact that learning to switch in the MHP is 
due to surface similarities without regard for the deep structural similarities between the 
card game and the MHP. Similarly, the switch and lose and stay and win conditions 
resulted in the greater surface similarity transfer to stay in the MHP.
It is difficult to explain the inconsistencies in the 10-card (3-door) situations 
across index card outcomes, especially in regard to the switch and win condition. The 
low switching rate in the latter condition was unexpected. Also, it is interesting that the
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3-card (3-door) situation had a greater switching percentage in the switch and win 
condition, and this was slightly higher that the 10-card (10-door) situation. The switch 
and win condition produced the best mapping of congruent surface similarities between 
the card game and the MHP.
The MHP probability estimations were close to the equal probability solution and 
fewer people correctly estimated the correct probability of switching and winning in the 
MHP. These results are consistent with the predictions proposed for this experiment that 
people would be less likely to deviate from the equal probability estimation. Since 
structural features were not playing a major role in transfer, participants may have based 
their estimations on their intuition that opened door was no longer a factor and that the 
probabilities were then equal.
The affect statement associated with the feeling worse with switching and losing 
than staying and losing was significantly different for switchers and stickers. It is 
important to note that overall most people agree with this statement. The emotional 
component of losing may play a role in the transfer of surface and deep structural features 
in the analogical reasoning by inhibiting people to look beyond the surface similarity and 
probe into the structural similarity.
General Discussion
The overall findings indicate that deep structural analogical transfer is difficult in 
the MHP. Surface similarity plays a greater role in influencing participants to switch in 
the MHP after exposure to a card game, especially in salient probability conditions. 
Participants learn the switching strategy in the card game and some adopt this strategy to 
the MHP, but they do not seem to be able to correctly discern the probabilities associated
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with switching either in the game or in the MHP. A few participants did correctly 
estimate the probabilities in the MHP, but these individuals were a minority. There is 
more to deciding to stay or switch in the MHP than simply understanding probabilities; 
learning experience plays an integral role as well as previous beliefs about expected 
probabilities. Even when the learning is counter to the actual probabilities involved (e.g. 
Experiment 3); participants learn a switching strategy superficially and apply directly to 
the MHP.
A few participants realized that their probabilities were lower if they stayed with 
their initial selection, yet they decided to stay rather than switch. Why do people stay 
even when they know that it is better to switch? One explanation can be a result of the 
intellectual investment attributed to the first decision. Perhaps, they felt that there was a 
reason for their first selection (intuition, implicit), therefore it overrides the explicit 
probabilities. “Even when people have no good reason for initial selection, having acted 
on it, they become psychologically bound or committed to it” (Granberg & Brown, 1995, 
p. 721). People tend to stick with their previous beliefs and rely on intuitions when 
approached with an ambiguous decision. In reality, this is probably a reasonable 
assumption and may have a high survival benefit. People do not have time to calculate 
the probabilities involved, therefore they may rely on their intuitions about their 
decisions, regardless of the initial randomness attributed to the first choice. Additionally, 
it requires cognitive work to alter your first decision after having committed to the first 
choice. People may employ a heuristic decision making approach in which they devote 
little time to thinking about alternatives, especially if the outcome likelihood is perceived 
to be equal (c.f. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
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Perhaps the reason for people to stay with the initial door may be due to affect. In 
the MHP, part of the decision process may entail a mental simulation of how it would 
feel to stay and lose versus switch and lose. Granberg and Brown (1995) propose that the 
MHP is a test of counterfactual thinking, for there are more negative feelings associated 
with losing after switching, then losing after sticking with the initial selection. They 
further postulate that people stay in order to avoid negative affect reactions. In the 
experiment, quite a few participants commented on their choice to stay in the MH was 
due to their affect of losing. For instance, one participant described the stay decision in 
the MH “because it would stink if I switched and found out that I had the right one in the 
first place”.
Investigations into counterfactual thinking have demonstrated that when two 
events have equal outcomes, reactions to the situation that was closer to the goal elicits 
stronger feelings than the situation perceived to be further away (Landman, 1988; Miller 
& McFarland, 1987). In addition, people feel greater regret following an action that 
resulted in an unfavorable outcome than an inaction (Landman, 1988). In the MHP, some 
participants explicitly stated that they would prefer to stay and lose than to switch and 
lose. To justify the outcome of an action, people will attribute greater value to a low 
relevance prize associated with an action versus and inaction (Gilovich, Medvec, and 
Chen 1992). This may explain why people have the overwhelming propensity to stay 
with the initial selection in the MHP.
Some future considerations should entail waiting a period of time (e.g. a few 
days) between the source and the target problem to see if the switching response in the 
MHP remains a factor of learning in the source problem. Holyoak and Koh (1987)
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demonstrated that people were still able to generate the correct solution to the target 
problem days after being exposed to the source problem. The counterintuitive nature of 
the MHP will be less resistant to transfer after a prolonged period of time.
Providing a source with an explicit solution about the probabilities involved in the 
MHP may aid deep structural transfer from the card game to the MHP. However, Novick 
and Holyoak (1991) demonstrated that adaptation of the source solution to the target 
problem is difficult with math word problems. Perhaps, teaching participants a crash 
course in Bayesian theory before giving them the card game and MHP may help people 
to map and apply the deep structural similarities between these two domains.
In addition, participants may not be motivated to learn the switching strategy in 
the card game and may require a payoff as an incentive. Granberg and Brown (1995) did 
provide participants with a $25 payoff; nonetheless, switching performance did not 
improve substantially. One could argue that the participants would need a larger payoff 
as an incentive, but the payoff may cloud the participants’ thinking of the game. 
Specifically, the participants may not try to interpret the switching strategy as based on 
conditional probabilities but one that works in the particular card game. Thus, when 
given the opportunity to respond to the MHP the surface similarity of the game will be 
transferred and not the structural similarity since the problem has not effect on the payoff.
Lastly, the false outcome feedback design in Experiment 3 should be investigated 
using computer card trials. Instead of programming the card game for the actual 
probability associated with the game, the incorrect (90 percent win/lose and stay/switch) 
outcomes would be used. In this manner, the salience of the participants’ performance 
will be an important factor in determining the extent to which participants rely on surface
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similarity between the card game and the MHP. Of particular interest, would be to see 
what occurs when the participant’s trial outcome is inconsistent with the person’s 
expected outcome. The inconsistency may provide an opportunity for participants to try 
to determine the actual probabilities associated with the card game. If they were 
successful, they could transfer this structural information to the MHP.
In conclusion, people are able to learn about different switching and staying 
outcomes through a card game played by the individual or viewing a card game that has 
already occurred. It is understandable that people do not readily think in terms of 
conditional probability. Nonetheless, people are able to learn about how to use a 
switching solution to a counterintuitive problem from prior experience. The MHP’s 
solution is counterintuitive and that requires mental work and learning to achieve partial 
insight to the problem. Transfer to the MHP is based on surface similarity between the 
card game and the MHP. A complete transfer from the card game to the MHP is rare 
since the structural similarity between the two domains is difficult to ascertain because of 
the conditional probabilities that are involved in both domains.
The use of analogies to solve problems or understand concepts can be a useful 
too, but it can also lead the person astray. Experiment 3 revealed the surface features of 
the card game influenced the transfer of the incorrect staying strategy. An analogy may 
be an inappropriate method for deriving solutions when that analogy that is retrieved is 
not the correct source or the incorrect solution was stored in memory. Thus, analogies 
can be useful for problem solving, but one must also use caution in using analogies to 
ensure the appropriate analogy is utilized.
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Appendix A
You are a contestant on a game show. An honest game-show host has randomly placed a 
new car behind one of three identical doors. There is a goat behind each of the other 
doors. Now you get to select a door.
What is the probability that the car is behind the door that you selected?
After you have selected your door, the host (who knows where the car is) opens up one of 
the other two doors to show that the car is not behind that door. He will always show you 
a door that has a goat behind it, and he will never open up your door.
You are now given the choice to stay with your initial door selection or to switch to the 
other door that you did not select and the host did not open.
Would you like to
 stay or _____  switch
Based on your decision to stay/switch, what is the probability that you will win the car?
Please briefly explain your answers below.
Have you ever seen or heard of this problem before? 
If so, what do you remember about it?
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Appendix B
Please use the following scale to rate the statements that appear below
1 2 3 4 5
Exactly Not At All
Like Me Like Me
It is easy for me to make decisions about day to day experiences (i.e. what to wear, what to eat 
etc.)
1 2 3 4 5
I never change my answers on multiple choice exams because I know that 1st choice is usually the best 
one.
1 2 3 4 5
I enjoy playing games more when I win.
1 2 3 4 5
When I make a decision, I usually stick with it.
1 2 3 4 5
I am confident in my decisions and usually choose the best option.
1 2 3 4 5
It takes me a long time to reach decisions that involve important aspects of my life (i.e. my major, 
my friends)
1 2 3 4 5
I rely heavily on my instincts/intuition when making decisions.
1 2 3 4 5
I would feel worse if I changed my mind and was wrong than if I stayed with my initial choice 
and was wrong.
1 2 3 4 5
I need to have overwhelming evidence presented before I change my mind on a decision that I 
have made.
1 2  3 4 5
I am stubborn and stay with my decisions regardless of promising alternatives.
1 2  3 4 5
When I change my answers on multiple choice exams, I am usually wrong.
1 2  3 4 5
I have a hard time making decisions.
1 2  3 4 5
I regret some of the bigger and important decisions that I have made in my life.
1 2  3 4 5
I am easily flustered when I am faced making decisions that will impact other people.
1 2  3 4 5
I feel that my luck influences my decisions.
1 2  3 4 5
I like to weigh all the options before making any decision no matter how small it may be.
1 2  3 4 5
I am not swayed by family/peer pressure when I am trying to make a decision.
1 2  3 4 5
I often second-guess myself after I have just made a decision.
1 2 3 4 5
I can usually make up my mind in a matter of minutes.
1 2  3 4 5
I change my mind easily.
1 2  3 4 5
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Appendix C
I developed the card game program. Do you think that the game was fair?
1 2 3'  4 i 5
Not At all Very Fair
Briefly explain your response to the above question
Did you follow a consistent strategy in playing the card game?
1 2 3 4 5
Not At all Completely
Briefly explain any strategies that you followed during the game
Do you feel that the card trial outcomes were based on luck rather than within your 
control?
1 2 3 4 5
Extremely Equally Based on Completely
Lucky Luck and Control within Control
Do you have any training in probability theory?
Yes No
If yes, please explain the extent and source of your training (i.e. specific course, 
experiences etc.).
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Table 1
Switching Percentages in the MHP for Cards by Doors
Experiment
Cards and Doors Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
3-card (3-door)
3-card (10-door) 
10-card (3-door) 
10-card (10-door)
31 47 31 
31 42 31 
52 50 27 
86 78 45
Table 2
Participants’ Mean Estimation of the Stay and Win Probability (%) in the MHP
MHP
Experiment 3-door 10-door
Correct Probability 33 10
Experiment 1 50 42
Experiment 2 50 46
Experiment 3 48 47
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Table 3
Number of Participants who Generated Correct Switching Probabilities 
in the MHP Across Experiments
Experiment
MHP Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
3-door 3 (n=71) 1 (n=70) 5 (n=129)
10-door 11 (n=71) 8 (n =70) 10 (n=129)
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Learning curves for switching across card trials for number of cards by choice 
constraint.
Figure 2. Switching learning curve for stickers and switchers in the MHP.
Figure 3. Mean switching response for 3 and 10-door MHP by choice constraint and 
number of cards.
Figure 4. Mean switching response for 3 and 10-door MHP by use of hint and number of 
cards in the computer card game.
Figure 5. Mean switching response for 3 and 10-door MHP by index card manipulation 
of stay/switch player decisions and win/lose outcome.
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